

SAN FRANCISCO (KGO) -- An alleged Russian agent will appear in federal court later this month after the FBI arrested him in October.
Igor D'iu is accused of stalking and surveilling employees at a Palo Alto tech and defense company because of its assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia. Sources tell ABC News it is the company Palantir.
Wednesday's announcement comes on the heels of the investigations into former NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang's affair with a suspected spy and a Saudi OpenAI engineer arrested in October after the FBI said he hid a secret recording device inside a company conference room.
In an exclusive interview, the head of the FBI San Francisco field office, Special Agent in Charge Scott Schelble, spoke with ABC7 Eyewitness News Anchor Nancy Chen about how Bay Area espionage has changed in the AI boom.
MORE: Silicon Valley experts analyze how recent Nvidia scandals could impact AI ecosystem
Excerpts here have been lightly edited and condensed.
CHEN: If you were to describe espionage in the Bay Area right now in one word, what would it be?
SCHELBLE: I would choose the word "frenetic." It is a constantly evolving threat. It is persistent, and it is really driving a lot of the concerns we have here in the division.
CHEN: When it comes to hot spots for espionage nationwide, where would the Bay Area rank?
SCHELBLE: Well, I think the Bay Area really ranks in the top when it comes to economic espionage. And that's because we really are, in this area, one of the leading centers when it comes to innovation. Technologies that are developed here within the Silicon Valley, within the tech sector, they drive the global economy.
CHEN: How would you describe this particular moment in terms of how have tactics changed? How has the pressure changed?
SCHELBLE: The threat really has evolved. While it remains consistent -- and I think the Silicon Valley and the tech sector remain a consistent target for foreign adversaries -- what we see now is the threat is more diverse, it's more networked, and it's more sophisticated. And what we've seen from foreign adversities who want access to this technology is an increasing leverage of use of their intelligence services, state-affiliated companies, universities and researchers, all with a common objective in mind, and that is to acquire our sensitive technology and then accelerate domestic production abroad.
CHEN: This has evolved far beyond the way that I think a lot of people imagine spying -- of a trench coat and passing secrets on a park bench. How has it changed in terms of how people are targeted?
SCHELBLE: Well, in a lot of ways, some of this has remained consistent...What we find now is that technology companies, the most persistent means of loss of their intellectual property comes from that insider access. So, it is a trusted person who has access to the company. And they then take or download that proprietary technology for personal gain or for gain from that foreign government.
CHEN: What are these foreign intelligence sources after?
SCHELBLE: I think they're after the innovation that drives the U.S. Economy...The companies in the tech sector put great efforts into this innovation. There is significant investment and research to develop these technologies. And they are going to drive the future global economy.
CHEN: What are the consequences if they get their hands on that technology?
SCHELBLE: It's a great question, because I don't want people to think of economic espionage as a victimless crime. The companies that have invested so much, they lose that competitive edge. Workers lose opportunities, investors lose value, and the United States risks losing that leadership role when it comes to critical technologies. So when intellectual property or sensitive technologies is taken from the United States, everybody in the country pays the price.
CHEN: Do you think that people still underestimate the threat?
SCHELBLE: Yeah, I think generally speaking, the threat of economic espionage is absolutely underestimated.
CHEN: How has the FBI evolved to keep up with this change?
SCHELBLE: One of the things that has happened recently, there's been a number of reforms at the enterprise level within the FBI. Part of that has included sending additional agents and analysts from their previous positions in Washington, D.C. to the field. That allows us to have a greater reach here domestically. Second, what's unique in San Francisco is how much we invest in that private sector engagement front. That's because we understand the prominence of Silicon Valley and the tech sector here. And those partnerships are what is key to our ability to mitigate the threat. Over half of our cases, when it comes to economic espionage, have originated because of a trusted relationship where that company reached out to the FBI early on in the investigation.
CHEN: And would you say that that's different perhaps than how things used to be even 10, 15 years ago?
SCHELBLE: Yeah, absolutely. In today's time, we do not have the luxury of sitting back and waiting to see what happens. So our engagement with the private sector is extremely proactive. It involves intelligence sharing. It involves threat briefings. It involves ensuring we have that trusted relationship. So when something sensitive to that company arises, we want that first call to be to us so we can work together to help contain, mitigate and prevent the loss of additional information.
CHEN: Some of that conversation also includes talking to these CEOs, these executives and telling them how much of a target they could be.
SCHELBLE: Yeah, of course, it is absolutely important in our engagements for the companies to realize that they are a target of opportunity. Any company that is going to be working with sensitive technologies or proprietary information is going to be a company of interest to a foreign adversary. And one of the things that we want to communicate to that company is the importance of having a robust process in place. And it's not just for our large, more obvious tech giants in the area. Startup companies are traditionally targeted. They're smaller in scope, and much of their operational revenue is dedicated to that research and development. That often comes at the cost of having a more established cybersecurity infrastructure where they're able to do that due diligence on their talent acquisition and to make sure that the folks they are bringing inside are the kind of employees they wanna have.
CHEN: Oftentimes, perhaps people in the tech industry might think, "I'm a junior employee. I have a startup. I would not be a target here." And you would say?
SCHELBLE: I would say, again, any company, regardless of size, if that company is working on sensitive technologies, particularly in these emerging fields, that company's absolutely gonna be a target for a foreign adversary.
CHEN: So much of what makes the Bay Area work is collaboration and networking. What are the warning signs that people should look out for?
SCHELBLE: We should always be aware of too many probing questions, talking too much about what's going on in that company. There is a community where different tech employees will talk to each other because they have that shared interest, and they have that shared knowledge base. But I think one thing that we see increasingly here is because so much is involved and so much is invested, that a company is pretty hesitant to lose that competitive edge on that next big product. But we certainly should be aware of anybody who is going to approach us and seek information about our positions or about what we're working on when it seems out of place.
CHEN: We're talking to you here on the heels of what's going on with NVIDIA, Jensen Huang, and OpenAI also reportedly getting a lot of attention for telling its employees to be aware of honeypotting. How much of that type of espionage should people be on the lookout for?
SCHELBLE: Well, Silicon Valley is always going to be a target because it is the hub of innovation. And while I'm not in a position to talk about anything that is specific individuals or anything that's currently being reported on, what I will say is from what we see, foreign governments are going to consistently target our tech sector for information, for access to that technology, because they have that goal of acquiring it and then accelerating for that domestic production.
CHEN: These companies are known for being on the cutting edge. What might even they be unaware of?
SCHELBLE: I think right now, the speed of which innovation is driving and the competition to be first often times will result in a slightly lower risk threshold. And so, we're sacrificing safety for speed. And that's one of the things I think, collectively speaking, we all need to be aware of right now.
CHEN: Which countries are the most aggressive in approaching this?
SCHELBLE: I mean, I would honestly say that really any country is aggressive, and one of the things that I want to make sure we don't fall into is a trap of thinking of a country as friendly or a country as adversarial. The benefit to acquiring these emerging technologies, semiconductors, biotechnology, super intelligence -- that is an attractive gain for any foreign government. And I think it's incumbent upon all of us to sort of keep that cautious approach, regardless of which country we're talking about, and not let our guard down.
CHEN: Is there one message you'd have for Silicon Valley companies?
SCHELBLE: The one message that I would like anybody to take away, but primarily those who are in Silicon Valley that represent an emerging technology company, whether you're a startup company, whether you are established, is to make sure you have that relationship with the FBI. If you haven't made that relationship yet, please reach out to us, please contact our sector engagement program because that relationship is key. Having that trusted partnership is going to be key to ensuring that we are best positioned to mitigate the threat of economic espionage and protect the work that you're doing.
CHEN: Has your office seen an increase in the number of tips involving these espionage sources?
SCHELBLE: What I can say is we see an increase in the level of activity when it comes to economic espionage and theft of intellectual property, but I'll also say that this area constantly churns out the next idea. So I wouldn't prescribe that as an increase in the rate of crime. I would prescribe it to a number of companies that exist here and the success of our engagement program and our outreach to the tech sector.
CHEN: I've noticed that you call it "economic espionage." What should people understand about the distinction between that?
SCHELBLE: When I talk about economic espionage, I'm talking about the intellectual property, the trade secrets that are developed by our tech sector, that are developed by the innovators, whether they're in academia, whether research, whether in industry. That is the secret sauce to what drives the success of these companies, and what I want to stress is even though we use the term economic espionage, this is not simply an economic issue. This is a national security imperative, which is why the FBI is so focused on mitigating the threat.